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ESSAY




Let us begin at the beginning: The presidential pardon
power is plenary. If a good President uses it to clear the re-
cord of civil rights protesters, convicted years ago, let us say,
of trespassing on federal land, neither the Congress nor the
courts may sit in review. If a wicked President uses it to
shield white supremacists from a courageous federal prosecu-
tor, there is no recourse. If the President uses the power to
make amends for the society's unwillingness to aclmowledge
religious differences, as President George Bush did on Christ-
mas Eve of 1992, no entity but the public can bring him to
brook; and if he uses it to prevent the prosecution of those
who carried out a controversial and probably illegal policy, as
President Bush also did on Christmas Eve of 1992, that is his
right. In particular, there is nothing even constitutionally fishy
in the President's use of the pardon power to frustrate the will
of the other branches, or to limit their ability to inquire into
executive affairs-as President Bush plainly did when he
granted pardons to several of the major figures in the Iran-
Contra scandal. To say that it cannot be used that way is as
silly as saying that the Congress should not use its legislative
power to criminalize policy disputes with the executive
branch-the rather thin explanation that President Bush of-
fered for his last-minute decision.
The idea that the Congress usurps executive authority
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when it enacts restrictions on the use or raising of funds is
absurd, but this idea enjoys much currency on the right (or
did, when the President was a Republican). The idea that the
President usurps congressional authority when he pardons
those the Congress would rather see punished is also absurd,
but this idea enjoys much currency on the left (or did, when
the President was a Republican). However, the simple truth is
that the powers of the branches of the federal government are
part of a system of checks and balances that each must use in
constant battle with the others. This system reflects how the
Founders thought that policy struggles would be carried on.
Not only would they be unsurprised by the Boland Amendment
or the Christmas Eve pardons, they would probably conclude
that both the executive and legislative branches were doing
their jobs.
In contemporary America, we often have trouble
envisioning the three branches of the federal government as
the Founders did, as independent power centers, each
struggling for supremacy over the others. We tend to think of
them .as parts of a machine that should work smoothly
together, an image that helps explain all the talk about
government gridlock. Gridlock would not have bothered the
Founders very much, for they, like Montesquieu, feared that a
government prepared to use all of its power for a single end
always risked tyranny-as I fear ours sometimes does.
So if the Congress wants to hamstring the President, or
the President wants to frustrate the Congress-or if, for that
matter, the Supreme Court wants to interfere with either or
both, we ought to understand that we are seeing the dream of
the Founders in action. The only legal rule that should apply
to such battles is that each branch must be exercising a power
that the Founders actually granted it-otherwise, the original
working balance of the political departments (Charles Black's
fine phrase) is upset, and the justification for whatever the
branch may be doing becomes tenuous. l Some scholars have
disputed this proposition,2 but they have, as a rule, offered
little to put in its place. One might of course envision a
federal government that can deploy its many powers in any
way that it deems efficient, but one needs no Constitution to
create it. Ours, however, is constitutionally created, a fact that
1.' See Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Improprieties, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 357,
369 (1990).
2. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence is
So Abysmal, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 511 (1989).
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should cabin, not expand, the forms through which powers
may be exercised.
The Supreme Court seemed to understand this for a brief
but exciting historical moment, as it struck down, for example,
the legislative veto3 and the automatic budget sequestering
provisions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act,4 both of which
were efforts to circumvent the cumbersome constitutional
procedures that sometimes make it so hard for interest groups
to get their programs enacted (the definition of gridlock).
Critics screamed that the Justices were being too formalistic,
but o:hly law professors consider that epithet an insult; judges
should be pleased to be accused of seeing the law as followed
instead of manipulated. More recently, the Court has fallen
down on the job a bit, sustaining such dubious innovations as
the Sentencing Guidelines Commission,5 to which the
Congress has delegated the legislative power to bind the
sentencing discretion of judges, and the independent counsel
provisiop.s of the Ethics in Government Act,6 which create a
class of federal prosecutors answerable to no authority.
II.
All of which brings us back to the Christmas Eve pardons.
To say that the President's pardoning power is plenary-not
subject to review-and that it is part of the system of checks
and balances-available to frustrate the other branches-is not
to say that every use of the pardon power is a good use of the
pardon power. The pardons to the Iran-Contra defendants were
defensible but, obviously, not on the ground that the President
offered.
Was another ground available? The answer is surely
yes-the pardons could be defended; but in order to find the
reason, it is first necessary to discard a few lemons.
Lemon No. l-Caspar Weinberger deserved a pardon
because of his long and dedicated service to the nation.
Actually, unlike many in academia, I think this is a
reasonable ground for a pardon, especially for a man who is
well on in years and in health and whose crime was, at worst,
rather marginal. However, the excuse remains a lemon because
not all of the pardoned defendants fit the category and the
3. Immigration & Naturalization Servo v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956 (1983).
4. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733-34 (1986).
5. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989).
6. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695·96 (1988).
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President took no steps to remove the stain of partisanship (or
self-protection) from his actions, as he might have done, for
example, by offering a simultaneous pardon to the estimable
Clark Clifford.7
Lemon No.2-The pardons were justified because all of the
defendants were victims of an overzealous prosecutor who long
ago overstepped his bounds. The trouble is, there is no way to
tell whether a prosecutor is overzealous unless one knows in
advance of trial who is guilty and who is not. Under our sys-
tem, one does not actually know. Of course, this demonstrates
a difficulty with the independent counsel legislation itself. In
ordinary cases, if the President or the Attorney General
believes a prosecutor is going too far, the prosecutor will be
reined in. The independent counsel statute is designed to
ensure that nobody can rein in the independent counsel. (The
Supreme Court suggested in 1988 that the law provides some
limits on prosecutorial freedom,s but that was an error.)9
Lemon No.3-The pardons were justified because the
statute providing for the appointment of independent counsels is
unconstitutional. As it happens, I believe the premise of this
statement to be true-I do think the independent counsel law
is unconstitutional because it transfers the executive and
therefore politically controllable power of prosecution to an
investigator-cum-prosecutor who is independent of presidential
control. I will not here detail the reasons for this view, having
discussed it in detail elsewhere, except to note that nothing in
the Supreme Court's decision sustaining it has convinced me of
the contrary.lO Moreover, it is certainly within the President's
authority to use the pardon power to show his disagreement
with the Court. Therefore, had President Bush placed the par-
dons on that ground-the unconstitutionality of the underlying
statute-he would almost have made a convincing case.
The reason for the "almost" is that President Bush did not
issue pardons for all individuals ever prosecuted by
independent counsels appointed pursuant to the Ethics in Gov-
ernment Act. He limited the pardons to the special favorites of
the right and in so doing made the stand on principle just
about impossible.
7. News accounts indicated that some political aides urged on President Bush
precisely this course. Unfortunately, hotter heads prevailed.
8. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695-96.
9. These problems are discussed in Stephen 1.. Carter, The Indepcndent COUT18cl
Mess, 102 HARv. 1.. REv. lOS, 114-15 (1988).
10. See id. at 110-11.
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Lemon No.4-The pardons were justified because they were
part of an effort to heal the divisions over a hard-fought
question of national policy. Although it has little to do "lith
law, this explanation is one that a person would most wish
were true of these or any other pardons. On the same day as
the Iran-Contra pardons, for example, President Bush
pardoned two Jehovah's Witnesses-one from the World War II
era, one from the Korean War era--each of whom had been
convicted of refusing to register for the draft. The refusal in
each case involved a religiously motivated understanding that
war is wrong. (The law allows one to register and then claim
conscientious objector status, but not to refuse to register at
all.) By expanding, as it were, our national tolerance of moral
and religious visions outside the mainstream, the President
sent a true message of healing.
Similarly, although it was politically wrenching at the
time, President Ford probably made the right decision in
pardoning Richard Nixon shortly after Nixon's resignation. Al-
though our national anger seemed to demand punishment for
Nixon's crimes, Ford believed that in the long run, the
national interest would be better served by enabling the ex-
President to avoid prosecution, leaving him untouched by legal
proceedings that would otherwise have kept alive our national
obsession with Watergate, which, in retrospect, it was plainly
time to put aside.
Do President Bush's Iran-Contra pardons fit this model?
One important distinction is that Ford, unlike Bush, faced the
voters after his decision. Put otherwise, the "healing" rationale
would have carried more weight had Bush handed down his
pardons on the 1991 rather than the 1992 Christmas list, for
he could then have faced the judgment of the American people
on his action. Indeed, the wrath or approbation of the voters is
one of the very few checks on the pardon power that exist.
The principal other check is the judgment of history. For that,
we will have to wait.
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